There have been numerous assassinations in Southern and central Africa and these continue to engender debate and discussion. The deaths of Patrice Lumumba, Samora Machel, Chris Hani and others have failed to put an end to the often controversial political lives of these people. 6 Every now and again, gusts of speculation and discussion breathe life into the glowing embers of the memory of people long gone. The memories of their deaths will be resurrected and refashioned to suit the political struggles of the day. In a sub-continent where much of the evidence regarding the 'dirty wars' remains hidden or has been destroyed, the absence of clear and unambiguous material and evidence will ensure that speculation will continue for many years to come. This is well illustrated in the recent work of Luise White, who has written an excellent book about the assassination of the Similarly, it could be argued, SWAPO has never admitted to killing people detained by the Organisation. For a discussion on the media campaign waged in Namibia in 1978 see, A. Heywood, The Cassinga Event, second revised edition (Windhoek, National Archives of Namibia, 1996), pp. 78-101. By way of comparison, this would be a little like being unable to find documents relating to the murders of Hans Martin Schleyer (18 October 1977) or Earl Mountbatten of Burma (27 August 1979). This is not to deny that SWAPO was involved in human rights abuses and murder. In exile, hundreds of SWAPO dependants and members were detained, tortured and killed without trial. Currently, the Namibian National Society for Human Rights, church organisations, and the 'Breaking the Wall of Silence' committee of ex-detainees continue to seek recognition and clarification regarding the deaths and disappearances of detainees in SWAPO custody. Evidence has come to the fore that directly impltcates many within the current Namibian elite in human rights abuses committed during the 1980s. Implicated are, amongst others, the 'Butcher of Lubango', the current Chief of the Namibian Defence Force, Major General Solomon Dumem 'Jesus' Hawala. Those seeking a detailed introduction to these events are referred to, S. Groth, Namibia The Zimbabwean nationalist leader, Herbert Chitepo. 7 In her work, White has followed the twists and turns of evidence and counter-evidence in relation to Chitepo's murder. In the end, White's work is not about discovering who did the deed; instead it seeks to discover what lies behind the charges and confessions made in relation to Chitepo's death. In contrast, I have written this article as part of an attempt to find out more about my past.
Who was Kapuuo?
Clemens Matuurunge Kapuuo was born on 16 March 1923, the year in which Samuel Maharero died in exile in Serowe, Bechuanaland Protectorate. Kapuuo was born at Teufelsbach in the district of Okahandja, the son of Onangandji Alexandrine Kandirikira and Clemens Kapuuo Snr, who became a wealthy and prominent trader and influential politician in Windhoek in the inter-war period. Apart from being related to Samuel Maharero through his matri-clan, Kandikirira, he was also the nephew of the first Namibian nationalist leader, Chief Hosea Kutako, Samuel Maharero's chosen representative in Namibia.
Kapuuo senior owned several shops in Windhoek location and served on the location advisory board and his son grew up in a household and surroundings that continuously dealt in, and discussed politics. Like many of Namibia's other early nationalists, Clemens Kapuuo attended St Barnabas College in Windhoek, after which hè qualified as a teacher at the Stoffberg Training College in the Orange Free State in South Africa. 8 After teaching at Waterberg, the site of the Herero defeat in the Herero-German war, Kapuuo taught at Karibib and at his alma mater, St Barnabas.
Kapuuo was active in opposing the move, under the apartheid Group Areas Act, of the old location to Katatura, situated eight kilometres away. In this Opposition Kapuuo co-operated with the present President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma. Opposition to the move, which included bus boycotts and a boycott of the municipal Beer Hall, culminated in a demonstration in which at least 11 people were shot and killed and many more injured by police on 10 December 1959. In the aftermam of the shooting, many people fled the location, fearing further violence, and the move to Katutura continued. However, in the end people were forced to move following the shooting of 10 December 1959. The last houses in the old location were forcibly cleared in August 1968. In the process, St Barnabas was also destroyed. 9 Even though hè understood the colonial languages of English, German and Afrikaans, Hosea Kutako, leader of the Herero in Namibia who had petitioned South Africa at the United Nations, used Clemens Kapuuo as his interpreter in all of his dealings with the press and South African officials. 10 One such journalist noted of a meeting held in 1956: Clemens Kapuuo -secretary and confidante of the highly respected Chief Hosea Kutako -had been chosen to succeed Kutako, not only as chief of the Herero and representative of the house of Maharero, but also as a chief who would continue the tradition of struggle and Opposition to South African rule that had been established by Hosea Kutako. During his long and complex life and his rule as chief of the Herero, Hosea had consistently sought to regain Herero, and later Namibian, rights to self-determination. Hosea Kutako died in 1970, a symbol of nationalist resistance to South African rule. Indeed, after the independence of Namibia, Windhoek's international airport, which until then had been named in honour of South Africa's second apartheid era Prime Minister, J. G. Strydom, was renamed in honour of Hosea Kutako, as was Republiekweg, a major thoroughfare in Windhoek.
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With the death of Kutako and the installation of Kapuuo, it was expected that Kapuuo would maintain Kutako's position of consistent Opposition to South African rule.
The First Years of Kapuuo's Rule
During the first years of Clemens Kapuuo's rule as chief of the Herero hè appeared to be following in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessor. However, there is no doubt that Kapuuo's style of leadership was different to that of Kutako. While Kutako favoured consensus politics and would allow meetings and discussions to carry on until consensus was reached, Kapuuo was a more forceful leader, and was not above cutting discussion short before consensus had been reached.
14 Yet, in terms of policy, Kapuuo followed Kutako's example. The Herero-German war of 1904-1908 had brought about the destruction of Herero society, the loss of all its land, stock and goods, and the death of no less than 80 per cent of its population. 15 As the son and representative of people who had experienced the füll devastation of war, Kapuuo followed Kutako and opposed all calls to arms. Kapuuo knew füll well what war had brought to the Herero of central Namibia.
In 1971, the year after Kutako's death, Kapuuo was elected head of the National Convention, a loose alliance of political parties united in their Opposition to South African 16 In the same year, Namibia was wracked by major industrial action. In the clampdown that followed, numerous people were detained and Clemens Kapuuo was fired from his position as a teacher on account of his political involvement and vocal Opposition to South African rule. 17 In the wake of the clampdown, thousands of young men fled into exile and the guerrilla war, initiated by SWAPO against South African rule, expanded. A state of emergency was declared in the northern parts of Namibia in 1972, and the following year the South African Defence Force took over the task of counter-insurgency in Namibia.
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Riding the Tiger
Yet within a few years, Kapuuo's role as a symbol of anti-colonial resistance would be thrown into doubt, when in 1975 hè announced that hè would be participating in the South African-sponsored Turnhalle Conference. The conference, held between South African government representatives and representatives of the South African appointed 'tribal Authorities', was to draft an ethnically-based constitution for the territory. In the run-up to the talks, Namibian churches expressed the Opposition feit by many when they resolved that, 'these talks were unilaterally organised and planned by the South African government and were looked upon by the majority as unwanted and unjust'. 19 The words of the renowned Namibian political scientist, Andre du Pisani, clearly expresses the confusion feit by many regarding political developments in Namibia in 1975:
For most local observers Clemens Kapuuo's decision to participate in the Turnhalle constitutional conference came as a surprise, for here was a man openly opposed to South Africa's policies of ethnic fragmentation in Namibia. Furthermore hè had gone so far as to petition South Africa at the United Nations, and had previously rejected the Prime Minister's Advisory Council (the institutional predecessor of the constitutional conference) on the grounds that South Africa had no right to establish such a body. 20 How was it that a man renowned for his consistent Opposition to South African rule suddenly chose to associate and co-operate with the South Africans? I believe that the answer lies in the issue of land. In 1962, the South African administration appointed the Odendaal Commission, of which it has been noted that:
The recommendations made by the Commission had little to do with promoting the welfare of black Namibians. Instead, they mirrored a desire to entrench territorial apartheid in Namibia. 21 In terms of the Commission's report, the existing 'Native Reserves' were to be redesigned on a completely ethnic basis. 'Self-government' on the basis of these ethnic 'homelands' was to be the ultimate political objective. 22 In terms of the report, the Aminuis Reserve, an ethnically mixed reserve, formed the basis of a future, still to be established Tswana homeland. It would thus have to be cleared of all inhabitants not deemed to be Tswana. In other words, the Herero living there would have to leave the reserve and resettle in Epukiro Reserve, the envisaged basis for a Herero 'homeland' (Hereroland), which would lie 200 kilometres to the North.
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Aminuis Reserve and the lands associated with it were, and still are, of paramount importance to the Herero. In the 1920s, when the Herero had been forced off the central Namibian highlands, Aminuis Reserve was one of two major reserves in which the Herero were re-settled. Aminuis Reserve, more importantly Taosis, was the site of Hosea Kutako's settlement. 24 In terms of the report of the Odendaal Commission, the Herero would have to leave Aminuis. For the Herero this would mean further loss of land, an aspect that is of central importance to Herero society.
Thus it was that land, and more specifically the Aminuis Reserve, was to be the factor that ensured Kapuuo's willingness to begin co-operating with the South African administration. In 1974, after intensive lobbying on the part of Kapuuo and nis followers, the South African government announced that it would no longer be pursuing the creation of a Tswana homeland in the Aminuis area.
25 By implication, the Herero living in Aminuis no longer faced the threat of forced removals. Kapuuo's intensive talks with the South African authorities in connection with Aminuis coincided with the decision of SWAPO to withdraw its support from the National Convention. In withdrawing from the convention, SWAPO lashed out at Kapuuo, who, for his part, emphasised the importance of land. Referring back to the wars waged by the Herero and Nama against German colonial rule and the loss of their lands, goods, and people in the early twentieth Century, Kapuuo argued that: representative of the Herero was present. Kozonguizi, who had gone into exile in the early 1960s and had broadcast tirades on Radio Peking accusing SWAPO of having adopted a 'reformist approach', accompanied Kapuuo as his legal adviser. 28 Commenting on nis involvement in the Turnhalle Conference, Kapuuo stated: that his first priority was to consolidate the Herero position, and then to bargain for a reallocation of economie resources, notably land. 29 It would appear that Kapuuo, who consistently opposed the armed struggle, believed that hè could 'ride the tiger' and gain the benefits that hè believed his followers needed. Indeed, in May 1977, when the Chief Native Commissioner for Namibia, Mr Strauss, called a meeting with Kapuuo to discuss the formation of a Herero legislative assembly, similar to those that already existed in Owambo, Kavango and Caprivi, Kapuuo refused to altend on the grounds that he did not want to be involved in the creation of a 'Bantustan'.
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The Political Climate in South Africa and Namibia, March 1978
In early 1978, at the time of Kapuuo's murder, it is safe to say that the apartheid government of B. J. Vorster was under pressure. The Soweto student uprising of 1976, the collapse of Vorster's vaunted policy of détente with Africa, the independence of the Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique, along with the presence of Andrew Young as the Carter administration's ambassador at the United Nations, all served to bring pressure to bear upon Vorster's regime. 31 That government, which was centred upon a power base within the highly politicised South African Police force, and its off-shoot (Vorster's own creation), the Bureau of State Security, demonstrated a clear lack of vision, beyond that of brute violence, when it came to dealing with Opposition to its rule. The callous killing of Steve Biko in 1977, coupled with the continued unrest in South Africa, showed up the inability of the South African security apparatus to control and contain dissatisfaction within the black community. 32 Effectively, Vorster was unable to control the South African Situation and lacked the later vision and ideology characteristic of Botha and his securocrats. 33 In early 1978, at the time of Kapuuo's murder, P. W. Botha was the South African Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan was Chief of the SADF, General Constand Viljoen was Chief of the Army, Major-General Jannie Geldenhuys was the commanding officer of the South West Africa Command, and General Kat Liebenberg was commander of the South African forces in Sector 10, Namibia. Angola with the covert support of the CIA. Operation Savannah, as the Invasion was named, was carried out without the South African cabinet, let alone parliament, being informed. 35 However, sections of the Broederbond were informed (most notably its chairman, Gerrit Viljoen, who later became the South African Administrator-General for Namibia). Closer to home, SWAPO, or more specifically its military wing, PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia), stepped up its military campaign against the illegal South African occupation of Namibia. Following Angolan independence, PLAN launched annual 'invasions' of between 500 to 1,500 soldiers. Although these incursions were inevitably driven off by SADF actions, they did ensure continuing populär support for SWAPO. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3111, of December 1973, declared SWAPO 'the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people'. One unfortunate consequence of this resolution was that many Namibians in exile, most notably SWANU members, found themselves ostracised, forced into joining SWAPO, deported or detained. The indications are that South African agents had infiltrated SWANU members in exile and were instrumental in encouraging them to return to Namibia. In the event, many Namibians who had gone into exile in the early 1960s now began returning to Namibia. One such person was V. Mbaeva, a lecturer at CUNY in New York, who returned to Namibia from exile in the hope of becoming 'Bantu Commissioner' at 'Rietfontein Block' in the Herero Reserve. 36 Another returnee was Kozonguizi, who became Kapuuo's legal adviser in the constitutional conference that became known as the Turnhalle Conference. In response to the Turnhalle Conference, the United Nations reiterated its continuing Opposition to the South African occupation of Namibia. UN resolution 385 of 1976 once again revoked South Africa's rights to administer Namibia and led to the establishment of the 'Western Five' Contact Group, comprising Britain, France, West Germany, Canada and the US. In early 1977, the Conference submitted a 'final concept' for the establishment of an interim government and a plan to create three layers of administration under which the country would proceed to independence. However, many in Namibia as well as the outside world rejected Turnhalle because it was structured on an ethnic basis, particularly at the second and third levels of government, where the basic territorial divisions outlined in the Odendaal Report were to apply.
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As the Turnhalle Conference progressed, large sections of the Namibian population continued to declare their allegiance to SWAPO. Thus, in 1976, a major section of the country's Nama population, under the leadership of Rev. Hendrik Witbooi (grandson of the great anti-colonial leader Hendrik Witbooi), declared allegiance to SWAPO. Similarly, in 1977, a major section of the Herero, most notably those allied to the royal house of Maharero/Tjamuaha, publicly declared that they would have no further dealings with the Turnhalle Conference, and that they supported SWAPO. Interestingly, at that stage, the royal house of Maharero/Tjamuaha was being led by Rev. B. G. Karuaera -the man who, along with Clemens Kapuuo, had been Hosea Kutako's personal secretary. Kapuuo, for his part, formed an alliance with representatives of the eleven other ethnic parties participating in the Turnhalle Conference and formed the Democratie Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) in November 1977. 38 35 As the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) noted, 'Indeed, the issue (Operation Savannah) was not even raised at cabinet level until the invasion was several months old and no longer a secret', C. Villa-Vicencia and S. 40 The newspapers of the time describe the clashes as being between the DTA and SWAPO, or 'SWAPO en Herero', where SWAPO came to be equated with Ovambo. 41 The unrest culminated in the killing of Julius Kambirongo (an aide of Clemens Kapuuo), whose throat was slit and who was then battered to death, after hè had opened fire on a crowd of SWAPO supporters. 42 The unrest died down after church leaders initiated talks between SWAPO, DTA, and other community representatives. Three weeks later, on the evening of Easter Monday 1978, Clemens Kapuuo was gunned down.
The materials contained within the inquest docket for Kapuuo indicate that the assassination of Kapuuo was meticulously planned and carried out. Kapuuo was shot by two men who fired between two and six bullets in total. The newspapers at the time claimed that the shots had been fired from a Tokarev pistol, implying SWAPO involvement, but no mention was made of this in the inquest. Instead, the calibre of one of the recovered bullet casings is given as 7.62 mm. The autopsy, conducted by the state pathologist Dr J. P. Nel, indicates that soft-nosed dum-dum bullets were used. Dum-dum bullets leave small entry holes and 'mushroom' or explode as they pass through the body. In the case of Kapuuo, hè was hit by a bullet which entered just below his left shoulder blade and ripped through the lower part of his left lung, tore through his aorta, oesophagus, and trachea. The bullet then cut through the upper half of his right lung before exiting the body. The lower part of Kapuuo's back was covered by the fragments of a second bullet that had disintegrated before impact.
The actual assassination seems to have been carried out by a team of four men driving a blue Chevrolet custom pick-up with Windhoek registration plates and black wrought iron railings attached to the loading bed. The truck was parked some distance from the street in which Kapuuo's store was located. The car turned and stopped, three of the men got out to urinate, then two walked off and the remaining man re-joined the driver in the cab of the truck. After about half an hour, it was reported that the two men came running back and jumped onto the back of the Chevrolet, which by that stage was already rolling down the street with its engine running. The Chevrolet and the hit team disappeared, never to be seen again.
SWAPO Blamed by the Media
Immediately after Kapuuo's assassination, the media and the South African authorities blamed SWAPO for the killing. A report carried in the Windhoek Advertiser, a Windhoek newspaper, the day after the assassination noted: The Advertiser's night staff was probably the first to learn of the shooting. About 15 minutes after the assassination, a telephone call was received to say that Mr. Kapuuo had been murdered. We at first took the story to be a hoax, but a quick check proved it true. At that stage, the Divisional Commissioner of Police, Brigadier H. V. Verster, made a brief statement in which hè confirmed the attack on Mr. Kapuuo, Brigadier Verster was conspicuously angry and made a few strong derogatory remarks about the SWAPO movement which hè blamed for the The German language newspaper, Allgemeine Zeitung, also blamed SWAPO and described Kapuuo as the third sacrificial victim [opfer] after the earlier killings of Chief Elifas in August 1975 and Toivo Shiyagaya in February 1976. 44 The following day, the newspaper claimed that Kapuuo had been shot with a Tokarev pistol, and reported that South Africa's Foreign Minister, Roelof 'Pik' Botha, as well as troop reinforcements, had been flown in to Namibia from South Africa. 45 The Afrikaans language newspaper, Die Suidwester, cited Brigadier Verster and quoted him as saying, '[I]t is logical that the assassins (sluipmoordenaars) could be SWAPO terrorists from the north of South West' , 46 In addition, Allgemeine Zeitung reported that on account of the cartridges found at the scène of the killing it had been concluded that a Tokarev pistol had been used. 47 Given the mindset that existed in Namibia at the time, what Verster and the newspapers said indicated that the signs clearly identified the killers of Clemens Kapuuo as SWAPO 'terrorists' who had come from the north armed with Tokarev pistols -weapons produced in the Soviet Union. Witness reports collected by the police in the days following Kapuuo's assassination identified the killers as either Ovambo or SWAPO guerrillas. As one of the witnesses stated, 'I know Ovambos'. 48 While another witness stated, 'Given that the deceased was headman of the Herero people, I suspect that the deceased was shot by Swapo
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terrorists .
The Aftermath
Almost immediately after news of Kapuuo's death became known, ethnic clashes broke out in Katutura. Riot police, who had been flown into Windhoek earlier on in the month, and armed gangs of Herero and SWAPO militants clashed with one another in a spiral of violence. 50 Informants living in the area of Kapuuo's shop remember the time as one of teargas and fear, with most residents seeking shelter in their houses for days on end.
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With the killing of Kapuuo, and the widespread belief that hè had been killed by SWAPO (and thus Ovambo) guerrillas, the war in Namibia became highly ethnicised. The war in Namibia was represented in simple terms that placed southern and central Namibia in Opposition to Ovamboland, and the DTA against SWAPO. The united urban Opposition to South African rule, which had existed so strongly in the Old Location, and had to some extent continued to exist in Katutura, was broken. Henceforth, it became well nigh impossible for people to enter parts of Katutura. Whole sections of the township had effectively become no-go zones. 52 The ethnic Separation so keenly sought by apartheid planners was achieved overnight. From this time on, young Ovambo men would have been courting death if they were to venture alone into those areas of Katutura that were zoned for Herero occupancy. Many young men simply disappeared, their mutilated bodies found later in the vicinity of Goreangab dam. 53 Henceforth, the Herero turned their backs en masse on SWAPO. Whereas in the past there had been attempts at forming a united front against South African occupation, the killing of Kapuuo effectively ended this. 54 Whilst conducting research amongst Herero living in Botswana, anthropologist Kirsten Alnaes noted the following:
...the belief that SWAPO had killed chief Kapuuo. (...) At this time I was told: 'SWAPO is our enemy, they kill our people. SWAPO killed our chief. SWAPO take our children to take them to the boers to kill them'. 55 There have been unconfirmed rumours that, as of September 1977, when Rev. Karuera declared his support for SWAPO, Clemens Kapuuo had initiated talks with the SWAPO leadership. However, it is more likely that talks between SWAPO and Kapuuo took place in November 1977, when Kapuuo travelled to the United States to lobby members of the OAU at the UN. 56 In an interview conducted shortly after the death of Kapuuo, Emil Appolus, one of the founding members of the Ovamboland People's Organisation, which later became SWAPO, reiterated Kapuuo's standing as a true nationalist.
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The Democratie Turnhalle Alliance, the party to which Kapuuo had been elected as president, was extensively funded by South African government 'slush fund' money. 58 In the aftermath of Kapuuo's killing the DTA did all in its power to 'milk' the incident for what it was worth. The run-up to Kapuuo's funeral, as well as the funeral itself, was used by the DTA as a continuous publicity campaign. Particularly pathetic was a photograph placed in one of the Windhoek newspapers that showed three adolescent boys with bowed heads at the grave of Chief Hosea Kutako in Okahandja, with the following caption:
At the grave of his predecessor, brown and white, Nama, Herero and Afrikaner position themselves in silent tribute on either side of their Herero chum. These young members of the DTA .... in a strikingly quiet graveyard in the heart of South West.
On Sunday thousands of mourners are expected there to pay their last honours to Clemens Kapuuo, leader of his people and -through his presidency of the alliance in which all eleven population groups of the country are united -also leader of the whole of South West.
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Be that as it may, it is true to say that following the assassination of Kapuuo, the DTA gained populär support, particularly amongst the Herero population of Namibia.
The assassination of Kapuuo also meant that the position of paramount chief of the Herero feil vacant. This was taken by Kuaima Riruako, a man with an extremely convoluted past. In the early 1960s Riruako had gone into exile, living in Botswana, Zambia, Ethiopia and Ghana. After the coup in Ghana he was deported to Zambia, which in turn deported him to South Africa. After a year of torture and solitary confinement in Pretoria, Riruako was declared a prohibited immigrant and dumped on an island in the Zambezi river, from which he was rescued by Zambian fishermen after three days. In 1969, following the intercedence of an 'American development officer', Riruako received funding from the African-American Institute which enabled him to travel to New York. 60 In 1973, Riruako was appointed NUDO's chief representative to the United Nations. 61 In 1977, Riruako addressed the United States Congress äs NUDO's representative. That same year, Riruako came to enjoy the dubious distinction of being the first exile to return to Namibia on a South African passport. At the time of Kapuuo's assassination, Riruako was in Paris, which is also where hè was informed that hè was to become the new paramount chief of the Herero. Riruako was inaugurated as paramount chief of the Herero in Toasis in the Aminuis Reserve. 62 The ceremony took place in a DTA tent, and DTA vehicles were used to ferry attendants to and from the ceremony. At the same time, Riruako was elected as president of NUDO. 63 When internal elections were held in Namibia in November 1978, the DTA, led by Chief Riruako, polled 41 of the 50 seats available. 64 The assassination of Kapuuo was used by the South African administration to justify its crackdown on SWAPO within Namibia. Indeed, SWAPO itself was never formally banned, as had been the case with the ANC and PAC in South Africa; instead, the movement was allowed to continue to exist although SWAPO activists were subject to continual harassment and detention. 65 As one South African official told Major Robert C. Owen of the American air force:
... the so-called internal wing of SWAPO is even allowed to conduct 'legitimate' political activities throughout Namibia to keep it out in the open, and to keep the faint-hearted from going to Angola. 66 Following Kapuuo's assassination, Axel Johannes, one of the most prominent SWAPO activists in Namibia, was arrested and accused of the murder. The treatment of Johannes is indicative of what happened to SWAPO activists around the country. At one stage hè was taken to a river in the vicinity of Windhoek, hung from a tree, buried in sand, systematically beaten and told to disclose the identity of Kapuuo's assassins and the whereabouts of the murder weapon. 67 Even though Johannes could prove that he was not in Windhoek at the time of the murder, hè was tortured to such an extent that hè signed a prepared confession.
Yet, 'No one was ever charged for this murder, though we know from Axel Johannes that the police were desperate to assign responsibility to SWAPO which has always denied it'. 68 Apart from cracking down on SWAPO within Namibia, the killing of Kapuuo was also used to justify the escalation of the SADF's military presence in Namibia and southern Angola. In early May 1978 Operation Reindeer was launched. This consisted of a series of major cross-border raids against SWAPO camps in Angola. 69 The wider ramifications of this Operation are examined below. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has summed up the impact of these raids as follows:
Some l 200 people -South West African, Angolan, Cuban and South African -died; over 600 others, overwhelmingly South West African and Angolan, were wounded in the attacks on Kassinga and Chetequera that day. It is probable that sonie died later from their wounds. In addition, several hundred were captured at Chetequera. No prisoners, or perhaps at most a handful, were taken from Kassinga. 69 At a press conference in Windhoek, Major-General Jannie Geldenhuys, the Commanding Officer of the South West Africa Command, announced the raid and justified the Operation on, amongst other grounds, the killing of Kapuuo and Toivo Shiyagaya. 70 In a late-night broadcast on the South African Broadcasting Corporation, which first broke news of the raid to the public, Geldenhuys stated:
On March 27 two terrorists assassinated the leader of the Herero people, Mr Clemens Kapuuo. The attack took place at his home in Katatura just a short while after hè and his tribal council decided on asking the Administrator-General for better protection of the political leaders of South West Africa. Before his death Mr Kapuuo was a strong supporter of the total destruction of terrorist bases across the Angolan border. 71 Following Operation Reindeer, the SADF presence became more pronounced than ever before and the further militarisation of Namibia continued with the introduction of conscription for Namibians.
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Covert Operations
The emphasis was more placed on disruption by means of indirect means of getting the enemy to kill itself, to detain itself and to disrupt itself. And physically killing them was placed more or less ... [a]s a last resort, soit of method. (Former CCB operative before the TRC). 73 After 1975, South African paramilitary personnel, some of whom had served in Rhodesia, honed their skills in counter-insurgency warfare in Namibia. Military units, such as 32 Battalion, which was established in 1976, were a home for former FNLA fighters from Angola as well as African mercenaries, 74 whilst Special Forces units, such as l Reconnaissance Regiment, were also home to professional, black African soldiers, äs opposed to conscripts. 75 There is considerable evidence that the process of "turning" was accompanied by torture and that the price of non-compliance was summary execution. Once "turned", these askaris and other Koevoet members are said to have carried out atrocities while disguised as SWAPO fighters in order to discredit the liberation movement, as the Selous Scouts had done during the Rhodesian war'. 78 Ellis, JSAS, 24, 2 (1998), pp. 267-8. 79 TRC, volume 2, chapter 3, § 42. DST was a highly clandestine Operation. Details of the command structure of DST in its early days are sketchy but it is known that then phase two: beginning D-7: The key idea should be to create the Impression of a resumption of SWAPO border violations and attacks on SADF patrols, especially against the local population. The intention would be after a relatively quiet period to refocus attention representing it as a seasonal trend. Shortly before D-1, information should be released on a SWAPO build-up. Thereafter, on D minus l, a grave incident (real or imaginary) must take place. Either attempted assassination or cross-border attack on SADF patrol base. In the case of the latter, some casualties could be attributed to this attack; ...
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The operational orders clearly indicate that the SADF was not above creating incidents and manipulating the true cause of death of its own soldiers. Particularly disturbing, in the light of the above, are the contents of an undated message from SWA Command to the Chief of the Army accompanying the operational orders found by the TRC:
Contingency plans in progress to create own incidents that can be attributed to SWAPO should insufficient publicity or further SWAPO actions be forthcoming.
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In other words, in March 1978 the SADF, or more particularly DST, was involved in a project designed to cause support for the SADF's intention to expand its role in Angola and Namibia. Kapuuo was killed on Easter Monday, 27 March, and buried on 9 April. On Ascension day, less than a month later, South African forces launched Operation Reindeer, the largest combined Operation carried out by South African forces since the Second World War. In the event, the killing of Clemens Kapuuo was one of the 'incidents' used by the SADF in its justification for the raid on Kassinga.
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South Africa and the Killing of Kapuuo
Whilst much of the history of the liberation struggle in Namibia still remains under-researched and unwritten it seems that a strong argument can be made that South African operatives were responsible for the killing of Clemens Kapuuo.
Windhoek in 1978 had a total population of under 200,000 people, of whom 150,000 would have been black. It is probable that there were no more than 5,000 motor vehicles registered in Windhoek at the time. Very few of these vehicles would have been Chevrolet Custom pick-ups and even fewer would have been blue with wrought iron bars. The inquest papers make no mention of any attempt to tracé the vehicle that was used -a vehicle which, given its size and cost, would have been noticed had it been abandoned, burnt or simply transferred to another part of the territory.
No firearms were ever recovered, although a recovered bullet casing was sent to Pretoria for ballistic analysis and comparison. 86 According to the report contained in the inquest, the casing was compared with the casings received earlier, and a negative result was reached.
We know from the affidavit of the Senior Medical Superintendent in the state hospital in Windhoek, Dr David J. Parsons, that the South African security police were involved in investigating the assassination. Parsons addressed his affidavit detailing the certification of Kapuuo's death to 'Security Police' Windhoek. Yet none of the security police's findings is included in the docket.
Although Kapuuo clearly had been murdered, the inquest docket indicates that the inquest findings were 'returned for filing' by the chief clerk of the Attorney-General and were not submitted to a judge, let alone to a judge of the supreme court. ) that 'A large quantity of equipment and supplies were destroyed and valuable documents seized. The loss of trained personnel and the effect of the information obtained by the security forces was a serious setback for SWAPO'. 90 The TRC report cited a message sent by SWA Tactical HQ at the time of the raid on Kassinga, which stated inter alia that 'A large number of documents were seized in the OC's house'.
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Thus, it would seem that one of the main objectives of the Operation, the seizure of documents, was achieved. Given the above, if SWAPO had been involved in the execution of Clemens Kapuuo, the planning, intelligence, coordination and so forth would have been executed from Kassinga base. In addition, given the success of Operation Reindeer, it is more than likely that SADF troops would have captured documents relating to the assassination of Kapuuo. However, these documents, if any were captured, were not revealed at the time. Letters and enquiries addressed to the former generals Viljoen and Geldenhuys in 2000, did lead to interviews, but failed to bring to light any of the documents that allegedly proved SWAPO's involvement in the killing of Kapuuo. Geldenhuys did state in an interview in 2000 that, on the eve of Namibian independence, documents relating to the murder of Kapuuo were offered to Dirk Mudge, chairman of the DTA, by General Willie Meyer, the SADF general 'in charge of closing shop'. Geldenhuys stated that Mudge turned down the offer, on the grounds that the documents would be dismissed as propaganda. 92 Nevertheless, the Windhoek Observer regularly prints extracts from documents allegedly captured during Operation Reindeer, which the newspaper's editor claims to have in his possession.
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In Summing Up
The assassination of Clemens Kapuuo was used in part by the SADF as justification for the launching of Operation Reindeer, which heralded the renewed overt involvement of South Africa in southern Angola. Operation Reindeer effectively scuttled any possibility of Namibian independence being attained through the five nations proposal that had been accepted by Vorster on 25 April. Instead Namibian independence came to be delayed for another ten years as South African securocrats sought to socially engineer Namibia into something more to their liking. During this period, Namibian society came to be highly militarised. The South African proxy army, the South West African Territorial Force, was established and compulsory conscription was introduced for all male Namibians south of the 'Red Line'. 94 The war became highly ethnicised; packaged as a war between Ovambo 'terrorists' and other Namibians within the various ethnic units of SWATF.
The assassination and the blame for the assassination, which was placed upon SWAPO, were used to justify the South African security forces' crackdown on SWAPO activists still living within Namibia. Kapuuo's assassination ensured that many Herero came to support the DTA en masse. The perception that SWAPO had killed Kapuuo effectively ended any form of dialogue that may have existed between SWAPO and large sections of the Herero population.
Conclusion
If the killing of Kapuuo was a covert South African Operation, it was a gamble, but one which paid off. It seems possible that the assassination of Kapuuo was one of the 'incidents' mentioned prior to the launch of Operation Reindeer in the undated memo from SWA Command to the Chief of the Army. This referred to 'contingency plans in progress to create own incidents'. 95 Operation Reindeer not only scuttled Namibian independence, but it also destroyed any possible overt western support that Vorster's regime might have hoped to have gained from his policy of détente and a possible form of Namibian 'independence'. The leaking by military intelligence of information that led to 'Muldergate' and the 'information scandal', sealed the fates of Vorster and his henchmen. 96 Vorster's days were numbered. Henceforth, P. W. Botha and his securocrats would come to determine southern African politics.
Conspiracies are not the usual haunt of academie historians, who should certainly refrain from becoming involved in such theories. By nature, conspiracy theories defy refutation. Nevertheless, the evidence emerging from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as well as the recent trial of Dr Basson have given increased credibility to the incredible. 97 In this article, a case has been made for the involvement of elements of the South African Defence Force in the killing of Clemens Kapuuo. This view stands in direct contrast to the claim that SWAPO was responsible for his killing. 98 In this, the article mirrors the work recently completed by Luise White on the assassination of Herbert Chitepo. In the case of Chitepo there have been four confessions to the killing and at least as many accusations. As with the assassination of Chitepo, it is possible that we will never know who killed Kapuuo. In the absence of a systematic history of the liberation struggle, it seems as though the struggle will remain fertile ground for conspiracy theorists for many years to come. 
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